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BRIEFPlacing land rights at the heart of development
Conversions of Customary 
Lands to LeasehoLd titLes Zambia
By nick tagliarino 
introduCtion
Zambia recognizes two types of land tenure: customary and leasehold 
tenure. While historically the majority of land in Zambia has been 
held under customary tenure, leases (also called leasehold titles) are 
the only legal means of holding land rights. in 1995, a new Land act 
was passed, which makes it easier for investors to acquire leasehold 
titles to customary land. When an investor obtains a leasehold title 
to customary land, the customary land reverts to the state once the 
lease expires and is thereafter governed by statute.  the erosion 
of customary rights that results from conversion is particularly 
burdensome on rural communities that depend on customary lands for 
drinking water, firewood, livestock, and other resources (Brown 2005). 
this brief analyzes the conversion process and its impact on rural 
communities, and discusses proposed solutions for securing customary 
land rights in Zambia.
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the amount of land held by customary communities in Zambia is diminishing, in part as a result of the 1995 Land act, which makes it easier for  
investors to acquire leaseholds over customary land. Photo: ©WorldFish
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C U S TO M A RY  L A N D  
I N  Z A M B I A
Customary land is crucial to the survival 
and well-being of rural communities in 
Zambia. Land is a source of food, shelter, 
social status and power (mudenda 2006). 
Customary lands provide communities 
with a commonly shared pool of natural 
resources. from the pool, villagers 
acquire drinking water from rivers and 
village wells, graze livestock on pastures, 
cut firewood and building materials from 
forests, and catch fish in lakes and rivers 
(Brown). Customary lands also function 
as a safety net in times of uncertainty. 
for instance, in southern Zambia, when 
rainfall is inadequate during dry seasons, 
communal access to the Zambezi river 
and its banks allow for villages to obtain 
water for grazing livestock (Brown 2005).
under customary tenure arrangements, 
rural villagers are given rights to 
customary lands based on their 
membership within a community. 
each community is unique, but, in 
many communities, membership can 
be granted or denied by the village 
headman (Loenen 1999). many 
communities organize their members 
into a social hierarchy at the household, 
village, clan, and chiefdom levels. the 
Chief is often the highest position on 
the hierarchy. the Chief has power to 
grant occupancy and use rights, oversee 
land transactions between community 
members, regulate common pools of 
resources, and adjudicate land disputes 
(Brown 2005).
T H E  B A S I S  O F  T E N U R E 
I N S E C U R I T Y :  H I S TO RY 
O F  L A N D  T E N U R E  I N 
Z A M B I A
throughout history, Zambia has followed 
a dual system of land tenure. in 1924, 
the British Colonial authority divided 
land into two categories: Crown Land 
and native reserves (Loenen 1999). 
native reserves were designated for 
the exclusive use of africans. Land 
rights on reserves were granted based 
on customary law. Chiefs controlled 
the use and allocation of reserve land.  
upon approval by the Chief and central 
government, non-natives were permitted 
to hold land in reserves, but not for 
more than five years. in 1947, the British 
Government carved out portions of 
utilized Crown Land to establish native 
trusts. on native trusts, the Governor, 
who was designated the leader of 
Zambia under British rule, could grant 
rights of occupancy for a 99-year period 
to non-indigenous people. despite such 
grants, native trusts remained under 
customary tenure and could not be 
converted to Crown Land (Brown 2005).
following Zambia’s independence in 
1964, Crown Land was converted to state 
land and thereafter administered by 
the ministry of Lands. all state land was 
vested in the President, and any land 
transaction involving state land required 
the President’s approval. freehold tenure 
rights to state land were abolished 
and converted to statutory leaseholds. 
meanwhile, on native reserves and 
trusts, indigenous populations continued 
to follow the tenure system which 
existed under British rule. the Zambian 
government continued to recognize the 
Chief’s right to regulate the use and 
allocation of trust and reserve land 
(hansungule 2001).
T H E  1 9 9 5  L A N D  A C T
following its election to government 
in 1991, the movement for multiparty 
democracy (mmd) proposed a wave of 
new land reforms intended to establish 
a more efficient system of tenure 
conversion in Zambia (mmd 1991). 
the mmd sought to institute a system 
which would attach economic value 
to undeveloped land and reward the 
the Chief has the power to grant occupancy rights to customary land, oversee land transactions between community members, regulate 




their members into a 
social hierarchy with 
the Chief at the 
highest position.
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productive use of property by making 
private titles to customary lands easily 
accessible for investors (mmd 1991). 
the Zambian Government justified such 
reforms by stating that customary land 
tenure is “insecure” and subject to 
“severe limitations” (GrZ 2000).  not 
only would a more secure tenure system 
benefit investors, but, by leasing land 
rights to investors, villagers would be 
able to use their land as collateral to 
secure credit to invest in farms and 
businesses (Brown 2005). to address 
these concerns, the 1995 Land act was 
passed, which codified a procedure for 
investors to acquire leasehold titles to 
customary land, and thereby obtain 
statutorily recognized land rights.
T H E  C O N V E R S I O N 
P R O C E S S :  H O W 
L E A S E H O L D  T I T L E S  TO 
C U S TO M A RY  L A N D S  A R E 
A C Q U I R E D
the 1995 Land act states that all land 
in Zambia shall vest absolutely in the 
President (sec.3(1), Land act, 1995). By 
law, all land transactions require the 
President’s consent except for grants 
of use and occupancy rights based on 
custom (sec. 8(3), Land act, 1995). 
the President may convert customary 
tenure into leasehold title under a wide 
range of circumstances as long as he 
takes into consideration local customary 
laws on land tenure and consults with 
Chiefs, district Councils, and any person 
whose interests might be affected by 
the conversion. (sec. 3(3)-(4) Land act, 
1995; sec. 4(d)(ii) admin. Cir.).  By law, 
the President delegates the day-to-day 
administration of land matters to the 
Commissioner of Lands (sec. 2, admin. 
Circ., 1985). the Commissioner of 
Lands is empowered by the President 
to “make grants or dispositions to any 
person subject to regulations enacted 
by the minister of Lands” (sec. 2, 
admin. Circ., 1985). 
the conversion of customary land to 
leasehold title requires approval from 
three authorities: the Chief, the district 
Council, and the Commissioner of Lands. 
first, the written consent of the Chief 
must be obtained by the district Council 
(sec. 4(d)(ii)(a), admin. Circ., 1985). 
next, the district Council must submit to 
the Commissioner of Lands a resolution 
recommending whether or not to convert 
the customary tenure into leasehold 
title. the resolution must include 
minutes from the Council’s committee 
meeting at which the decision was 
reached and an approved layout plan 
for the tract of land endorsed by the 
Chief, the Chairman of the Council, 
and the district executive secretary 
(sec. 4(d)(ii)(a), admin. Circ., 1985). 
district Councils are “advised” not to 
recommend the alienation of land areas 
that exceed 250 hectares (sec. 4(d)(v), 
admin. Cir., 1985). once the resolution is 
submitted to the Commissioner of Lands, 
the Commissioner of Lands then makes 
a decision on whether or not the land 
should be converted. the Commissioner 
of Land must invariably accept the 
district Council’s recommendation 
unless doing so “would cause injustice 
to others or if [the district Council’s 
recommendation] is contrary to national 
interest or public policy” (sec. 3, 
(admin. Cir., 1985)).
along with granting powers to the 
President to convert customary land, the 
1995 Land act also allows “any person” 
who holds land under customary tenure 
to apply to convert it to a leasehold 
title (sec. 891, Land act, 1995). the 
lease cannot exceed 99 years (sec. 8(1), 
Land act, 1995). their application must 
be approved by the Chief and district 
Councils (sec. (8)(2), Land act, 1995). 
Land may thereafter be converted into 
leasehold tenure “by way of a grant of 
leasehold by the President [or] any other 
title that the President may grant” (sec. 
8(1)(a), Land act, 1995). the President 
may extend the lease agreement to a 
The Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD) wanted to establish a more efficient tenure system that would reward the productive use of 




the 1991 election of 
the movement for 
multiparty democracy 
into government.
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term exceeding 99 years if he or she 
“considers it necessary in the national 
interest” (sec. 3(6)(a), Land act, 1995).
T H E  I M PA C T  O F  L A N D 
C O N V E R S I O N S  O N 
C U S TO M A RY  R I G H T S 
H O L D E R S
the 1995 Land act is silent on whether 
converted land remains customary 
land under the authority of traditional 
leaders. in practice, however, converted 
land is treated as state land governed by 
the Land Commissioner. it is also unclear 
whether the grant of a leasehold title to 
converted land necessarily extinguishes 
all customary rights previously attached 
to the land. although the act prohibits 
the unlawful occupancy of land that 
is converted to leasehold title, which 
means that holders of customary 
occupancy rights must vacate converted 
land, (sec. 9, Land act, 1995), it neither 
states what effect a land conversion has 
on customary use rights nor whether 
converted land remains subject to 
customary law. furthermore, the Land 
act does not stipulate what becomes of 
converted land once leases expire. in 
practice, customary rights attached to 
converted land are extinguished once 
leases are granted. 
the conversion process does diminish the 
Chiefs’ authority. only the Commissioner 
of Lands is considered the statutory 
landlord when lease agreements are 
made with investors. By law, Chiefs are 
not given any bargaining or oversight 
power to ensure the terms of the lease 
are adhered to and the land is managed 
effectively (metcalfe 2006). Land 
leases are only subject to statute and 
regulations passed by the ministry of 
Lands. (sec. 7, admin. Circ., 1985).
due to the high costs associated with 
obtaining leasehold titles, the conversion 
process puts impoverished villagers 
at a disadvantage (Brown). although 
the Land act provides villagers with 
an opportunity to use their land as 
collateral to secure credit, the cost 
of doing so is prohibitively expensive 
for many villagers. villagers must hire 
a surveyor to map their tract of land 
and pay a lease charge,  a cost which 
amounts to at least 500,000 kwacha 
(about $100) (Brown). for 99-year 
leases, boundary surveys can sometimes 
amount to millions of kwacha (hundreds 
of dollars) in fees (Brown). villagers 
must also bear transportation costs if 
the surveying team has to travel from 
Lusaka. furthermore, securing a lease 
entails incurring the cost of traveling to 
the ministry of Land offices in Lusaka 
and ndola. the ministry of Lands also 
imposes an annual ground rent charge 
for leasehold title holders (sec. 6(2), 
Land act, 1995). the rent charge is 
currently set by statutory instrument no. 
44 of 2006, which, when it was passed, 
increased the ground rent by between 
500-600 percent for all agricultural lands 
(statutory instrument no. 28 of 2010; 
Znfu, 2010).
the act’s vague wording also puts cust-
omary rights holders at a disadvantage. 
When deciding whether to convert 
customary land, the President is 
required to “take into consideration” 
local customary law and consult with 
any person or body whose interest might 
be affected by a land conversion (sec. 
3(4), Land act, 1995). however, the act 
provides no guidance on what is meant 
by the phrase “take into consideration,” 
and only requires the President to 
consider customary laws which are not in 
conflict with the act (sec. 3(4)(a), Land 
act, 1995). With respect to the provision 
requiring the President to consult with 
aggrieved persons, the act neither 
establishes how such a consultation 
should take place nor what remedies 
an aggrieved person should be afforded 
in the event of a conversion. since any 
person who continues to occupy the 
converted tract of land is liable to be 
evicted (sec. 9(2), Land act, 1995) and 
the act does not require the President 
to grant compensation for converted 
land, the conversion process may have 
devastating consequences for customary 
rights holders.
the only recourse for individuals who 
are aggrieved by land conversions is to 
file a claim with the Lands tribunal (sec. 
15, Land act, 1995). While the tribunal 
was intended to provide poor, non-titled 
individuals with a grievance mechanism 
by which they could protect their 
customary land rights, the tribunal has 
proven to be ineffective, inaccessible, 
and costly (Brown). aside from the 
lack of awareness among villagers of 
the tribunal’s existence, the tribunal 
rarely travels beyond Lusaka and thus 
claimants must incur traveling costs 
the high cost of obtaining titles means impoverished villagers can rarely take advantage 
of the conversion process, and those who are displaced by conversions do not receive 
compensation.  the Land tribunal, intended to help protect customary rights, has been 
proven ineffective, inaccessible, and costly.  Photo: ©World Bank
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faCt
to pursue their claims. in practice, 
claimants are also required to incur the 
cost of acquiring legal representation 
to draft affidavits and forms even 
though the Land act states that “the 
tribunal shall not be bound by the rules 
of evidence applied in civil matters” 
(sec. 23(5), Land act, 1995; Brown). 
Lastly, aggrieved parties are likely to 
experience excessive delays due to the 
current backlog of cases waiting to be 
heard by the tribunal (Brown 2005). 
C A S E  S T U D Y: 
C O M M U N I T Y 
D E V E L O P M E N T  T R U S T 
( C D T S )  I N  T H E  S E K U T E 
C H I E F D O M
to address some of these issues, the 
african Wildlife foundation (aWf), 
an international conservation nGo, 
has facilitated the establishment of 
Community development trusts (Cdts) 
in Zambia. Cdts are designed to secure 
customary land rights by mobilizing 
rural communities to acquire private 
leasehold titles to customary land. 
once customary land is converted into a 
leasehold title held in the form of Cdt, 
the land continues to be administered 
following customary laws and practices. 
under a Cdt structure, the trust 
proposes land sites to be converted 
for the traditional ruler’s consideration 
(metcalfe 2006). this way, traditional 
leaders can continue to regulate the 
allocation of customary land; however, 
under a Cdt, the traditional leader’s 
authority is statutorily recognized. 
traditional leaders are also responsible 
for mobilizing community members, 
overseeing and regulating Board of 
trustees elections, ensuring the Cdt by-
laws and constitutions are upheld, and 
resolving land disputes (metcalfe 2006).
Zambia’s wildlife abundance makes it an 
appealing tourist destination; however, 
when tourism investors obtain leasehold 
titles to customary lands, their revenues 
are not always shared with the local 
communities (metcalfe 2006). tourism 
investment has not led to improved 
health, education and infrastructure 
(metcalfe 2008; munodawafa 2005).   
By providing an outlet through which 
rural communities can directly manage 
private sector leases, Cdts can help 
rural communities generate revenue 
from the tourism industry. Cdts 
also appeal to private investors who 
seek a stable and effective business 
relationship with local communities.  
all community members are entitled to 
Cdt membership. to effectively manage 
communal lands, members of Cdts are 
organized into committees at the village, 
area, and chiefdom levels. the Cdt 
works in a participatory manner to seek 
investor lessees and regulate communal 
land as both a statutory and customary 
landlord. aWf has helped develop action 
plans that identify and prioritize key 
land and natural resource areas that 
should be managed by Cdts. 
in 2000, aWf began developing a Cdt in 
the sekute Chiefdom, an area of 250,000 
hectares on which 17,500 people reside 
(metcalfe 2006). according to aWf, the 
sekute Chiefdom was worth protecting 
because of its significant wildlife 
potential, good tourism sites, and 60 
kilometres of Zambezi river frontage 
(metcalfe 2006). after meeting with aWf, 
the Chiefs and traditional leaders agreed 
to develop a Cdt to manage land leases 
to private investors. the sekute Cdt 
drafted a constitution which organized 
the Chiefdom’s 289 villages into 
fifteen trust areas based on customary 
headmanship. each area had its own trust 
committee, which proceeded to establish 
village committees within its area. 
the sekute Cdt was organized into a 
hierarchy. at the top of the hierarchy 
is the Community development trust 
Board, which consists of trustee 
representatives from 15 area trust 
Committees. Below the Community 
development trust Board sits the 
area trust Committees, which consist 
of representatives of villages from 
15 area structures. Below the area 
trust Committees are the village 
trust Committees, which consist of 
289 village structures (10 households 
per village). each of the 2,900 
households in sekute elects a household 
representative to sit on one of the 
village trust Committees. overall, the 
hierarchy is designed to democratize 
the traditional system of land 
administration in the sekute Chiefdom. 
in 2003, a Board of trustees was elected, 
and eventually the sekute trust was 
registered with the registrar of societies 
in the ministry of home affairs. the 
sekute Cdt drafted by-laws to help 
manage natural resources in the area. 
the Kazungula district Council adopted 
the by-laws. the by-laws help regulate 
charcoal trading as well as streamline 
investments from the private sector. 
in 2006, a survey of sekute’s Zambezi 
river frontage revealed that land 
conversions to which the sekute Chief 
gave consent, without negotiating for 
ecological plans or community benefits, 
were threatening vital community access 
(metcalfe 2008). Community members 
appealed to the sekute Cdt. to protect 
remaining communal land, the Cdt 
decided that it would identify potential 
investment sites and pressure the Chief 
to allocate such sites to the Cdt. the 
Cdt also appealed to the district Council 
to cease processing lease applications. 
ultimately, the sekute Chief agreed 
to allocate several islands, wildlife 
habitat, and river frontage to the Cdt. 
in 2007, the aWf hosted a workshop 
with the sekute Cdt, which resulted in 
a written agreement on a process for 
issuing communal land. Pursuant to the 
agreement, traditional leaders and the 
Cdt will work together when negotiating 
future lease agreements with private 
investors (metcalfe 2008). 
under the 1995 Land act, almost all land transactions 
require the consent of the President of Zambia. the only 
exceptions are customary use and occupancy rights.
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WAY S  F O R WA R D : 
P R O P O S A L S  TO  R E F O R M 
T H E  L A N D  T E N U R E 
S Y S T E M
in 2006, the Zambian government 
published a draft Land administration 
and management Policy to address the 
problems with the land administration 
system. the draft Policy proposes that 
the Government will “introduce group 
land rights to allow for the registration 
of village, family and clan land…
recognize the rights of customary land 
users by defining their rights through 
a formal survey and registration… 
ensure that no chief shall recommend 
land for alienation without consulting 
his/her subjects… make the system 
more accessible and affordable to a 
wide range of eligible applicants… 
[and] decentralize the functions of the 
Commissioner of Lands…” (secs. 4.3.3, 
4.5, GrZ 2006). 
Because the Land act does not specify 
what happens to converted land at 
the end of the lease, in practice the 
land has reverted to the state instead 
of the community. Photo: ©Ciat
in 2006, a group of civil societies and 
customary leaders issued a response 
to the 2006 draft Policy (ZLa, 2008). 
it stated that the land policy should 
“ensure that, before consent for 
customary land to convert to leasehold 
is granted, there is consultation and 
consensus by all those affected by the 
said conversion. the ultimate authority 
to allow land to be given over for 
conversion will rest with the community” 
(ZLa, 2008). the civil societies also 
called for the establishment of “a 
reverse clause for customary land that 
is converted to leasehold to revert to 
customary land status…” (ZLa, 2008). 
although the Zambian government  
has not yet reformed the 1995 Land 
act, there seems to be some consensus 
among civil societies that strengthening 
the role of traditional communities 
in the decision-making process and 
providing for the reversion of customary 
land could help secure customary land 
rights in Zambia.
